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Reverence for Life and Rights for Nature
I. Introduction
Over the years, a number of writers, both legal and non-
legal, have criticized what has been identified as society's
"homocentric" attitude towards nature.1 This attitude, it is said,
is founded on a vision of the world that sees nature as existing
solely for the benefit of man; wildlife and natural objects are not
viewed as having any inherent worth in and of themselves.' In
the field of environmental regulation, this homocentric attitude
has been reflected in "legislation which protects nature not for
its own sake but in order to preserve its potential value for
man."
In response to the narrowness engendered by this attitude,
some writers have advocated the importance not only of recog-
nizing the inherent value of natural objects, independent of any
use they might have for man, but also of developing a sense of
human obligation towards nature and of actually extending to
wildlife and natural objects a variety of substantive and proce-
dural rights.4 These suggestions, however, have not yet found a
secure foothold in the law.5 In fact, to many the thought of
1. See, e.g., Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for
Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Tribe I]; White, The
Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis, 155 Sc. 1203 (Mar. 10, 1967) [hereinafter cited
as White]; Stone, Should Trees have Standing? - Towards Legal Rights for Natural
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 450 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Stone]; A. LEOPOLD, A SAND
CouNTY ALMANAC, WITH OTHER ESSAYS ON CONSERVATION FROM RouND RIVER 217-241
(1966) [hereinafter cited as LEOPOLD]; E. ASHBY, RECONCILING MAN WITH THE ENVIRON-
MENT 81-87 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ASHBy).
2. Tribe I, supra note 1, at 1325-36.
3. Id. at 1325.
4. Tribe, From Environmental Foundations to Constitutional Structures: Learning
from Nature's Future, 84 YALE L.J. 545, 551-52 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Tribe III;
Tribe I, supra note 1, at 1340-46; Stone, supra note 1; Dichter, Legal Definitions of
Cruelty and Animal Rights, 7 B.C. ENvTL. A". L. REV. 147, 161-64 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Dichter]; Burr, Towards Legal Rights for Animals, 4 B.C. ENTL. A"T. L. Rav.
205, 224-29 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Burr].
5. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), where the suggestions concerning
standing for natural objects made by Christopher Stone, supra note 1, were rejected. But
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recognizing rights in nature is "unthinkable" 6 or "idiosyncratic
at best and incoherent at worst."7
Yet, a possible theoretical framework for making sense of
such an extension of rights can, perhaps, be constructed. In par-
ticular, Albert Schweitzer's ethic of "Reverence for Life" might
provide the foundation for such a framework by replacing the
parochialism of the prevailing homocentric perspective with a
broader understanding of the meaning of human life. In describ-
ing what he meant by Reverence for Life, Schweitzer wrote as
follows:
A man is ethical only when life, as such, is sacred to him, that of
plants and animals as that of his fellow men, and when he de-
votes himself helpfully to all life that is in need of help. Only the
universal ethic of the feeling of responsibility in an ever-widening
sphere for all that lives - only that ethic can be founded in
thought. The ethic of the relation of man to man is not something
apart by itself: it is only a particular relation which results from
the universal one.6
Obviously, integrating such an ethic into legal theory and prac-
tice will require a rethinking of what our obligations and duties
as human beings are and what our relationship to the natural
world, and to life itself, really involves. It will also require a re-
evaluation of our assumptions about the fundamental nature of
law.
This Comment will attempt to sketch the general outlines of
a legal framework built on an ethic of reverence for life, and will
explore how such a framework can make sense of bestowing en-
forceable rights on nature. Before doing so, however, this Com-
ment will first examine the homocentric perspective - its prem-
ises and historical roots, its influence, and some of the criticisms
of it.
see Justice Douglas' dissent, which adopted Stone's suggestions. Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. at 741 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
6. Stone, supra note 1, at 450-57.
7. Tribe I, supra note 1, at 1329.





II. The Homocentric Perspective
A. Its Premises and Historical Roots
The homocentric perspective can best be characterized as a
view of the world that denies sanctity, inherent worth, or sacred-
ness to anything but human life. According to this perspective,
nature is somehow inferior to and separate from man; and man,
due to his superior intellect and mastery of technology, has the
"right" to manipulate, dominate, and control nature as he
pleases. Simply, all meaning flows from man and depends on
man's continued existence and creative activity.9
In the realm of modern day law and policy, these attitudes
translate into making the satisfaction of human wants and needs
the highest goal. To achieve this goal, utilitarian calculations are
applied to often conflicting individual human needs in an at-
tempt to maximize some overall benefit to society as a whole.
The natural world, of course, sits outside these calculations and
outside the web of humanly created rights and duties.10 Thus,
according to the homocentric perspective, man's duties are owed
only to other men; law exists for the sole purpose of ordering
human society; and man's sense of duty never extends beyond
himself.
Although there may be a general agreement as to these ba-
sic characterizations of the homocentric perspective, no similiar
agreement exists as to its historical roots. Lynn White, Jr., for
instance, has traced the roots to the Judeo-Christian tradition of
transcendence." This tradition, White argued, removed
whatever inhibitions man may have had to exploiting nature for
his own ends. It did so by destroying the older animistic reli-
gious belief that all natural objects possessed "spirits" that had
to be revered, feared, and placated.12 Simply, the Judeo-Chris-
tian tradition replaced spirits immanent in real objects with a
transcendent Spirit who, made in the image of man, created the
9. Tribe I, supra note 1, at 1329, 1335-36, 1341; Stone, supra note 1, at 493-95;
White, supra note 1; Hart, The Environmental Movement: Fulfillment of the Renais-
sance Prophecy?, 20 NAT. REOURCES J. 501, 515 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hart].
10. Tribe I, supra note 1, at 1325-26.
11. White, supra note 1.
12. Id. at 1205.
1983]
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universe for man's use."
Others have argued that the true root of the homocentric
perspective is the "secularization of science." ' According to this
line of reasoning, the Judeo-Christian tradition advocated not
only the superior position and powers of man, but also the sanc-
tity of the universe as a divine creation. Science initially adopted
both these views, but as Christianity's vitality wained, the view
of creation's sanctity was discarded, and a greater emphasis was
put on man's unrestrained ability and right to dominate
nature."
A third explanation for the origins of the homocentric per-
spective is that such an attitude is inherent in man. The propo-
nents of this theory note that despite all the talk of the influence
of Western science and religion on man's disregard for nature,
the facts are clear that the environmental destructiveness of
man has not been limited to parts of the world dominated by
Western science or religion."' Possibly, the psychological roots of
13. Id. In Genesis, for example, God said to the first-created male and female, "Be
fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over
the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth
upon the earth." Genesis 1:28.
One criticism of White's analysis is that he did not appreciate correctly the presence
of a doctrine of divinely inspired stewardship within the Christian religion. Tribe I,
supra note 1, at 1333-34. Such a doctrine was apparently suggested by some of the writ-
ings of Aquinas and was later expressed in a more complete form in the thought of St.
Francis of Assisi. Id. If such a doctrine in fact exercised much influence over Western
Europe's religious life, then White's evaluation of Christianity's disregard for the value
of nature might clearly be in error. White asserted that St. Francis' reverence for all life,
although praiseworthy as a model for modern man, was heretical in its own time to the
mainstream of Western Christianity. White, supra note 1, at 1206-07.
14. Hart, supra note 9, at 512-16. Lawrence Tribe-called this the "secularization of
transcendence." Tribe I, supra note 1, at 1334-35. White's lecture does indicate that he
was aware that early Western science had a strong religious motivation that later disap-
peared, but he uses this fact as further proof of the influence of the Judeo-Christian
tradition on science's domineering attitude towards nature. White, supra note 1, at 1206.
15. Hart argued that as the Christian ideals of the middle ages lost their influence,
and as the scientific pursuit became more and more secularized in the centuries following
the Renaissance, "the ethical limitations implicit in the past between God and man lost
their efficacy." Hart, supra note 9, at 516. Specifically, he claimed that the harshness of
the Baconian creed of mastery of nature through science was originally tempered by the
religious view that the world was a divine creation and therefore sacred. Id. at 508-12.
Hart wrote that, "[flor Bacon and his contemporaries, religion had provided the frame-
work for understanding science as a human activity." Id. at 516.
16. C. SOUTHWICK, ECOLOGY AND THE QUALITY OF OUR ENVIRONMENT 135-36, 119-32
(2d. ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as SoUTrHwCK]. It has also been claimed that the Chi-
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/15
RIGHTS FOR NATURE
the homocentric perspective reach very deep into the human
psyche, and can emerge even in cultures that believe in the sanc-
tity of nature. According to this view, man's destructiveness to-
ward nature is ahistorical and is merely a function of the fact
that "there are an increasing number of humans, with increasing
wants, and there has been an increasing technology to satisfy
them at 'cost' to the rest of nature.' 17
B. Influence of the Homocentric Perspective
Whatever the historical roots of the homocentric perspec-
tive actually are, the influence of the perspective on the modern
world can clearly be seen working in many of our environmental
laws as well as in our debates and discussions concerning envi-
ronmental protection. Environmentalists, for instance, who are
uncomfortable with homocentric attitudes nonetheless often find
themselves couching their arguments for conservation in terms
of the potential benefits to man, and ignoring other,
nonhomocentric lines of reasoning.' s It has been suggested that
such environmentalists may
want to say something less egotistic and more emphatic but the
prevailing and sanctioned modes of explanation in our society are
not quite ready for it. In this vein, there must have been aboli-
tionists who put their case in terms of getting more work out of
the Blacks. 19
As for our environmental laws, many of them clearly reflect
underlying homocentric motivations. The duties they create to-
ward nature often arise not from a sense of obligation toward
nature, but from the presence of a human interest that has been
identified with nature's well-being.20 Take, for example, animal
anticruelty statutes which, it has been argued, are actually more
nese belief in the unity of nature and man, an apparently nonhomocentric belief, failed
to prevent ruthless and continuous deforestation in China. Stone, supra note 1, at 494,
citing Murphy, Has Nature Any Rights to Life?, 22 HAsTNGS L.J. 467, 477 (1971). And
the American Indians, who supposedly lived in such harmony with nature, apparently
expanded their pursuit of the buffalos to fill the technological potential created by the
acquisition of rifles. Stone, supra note 1, at 494.
17. Stone, supra note 1, at 494.
18. Tribe I, supra note 1, at 1330-31.
19. Stone, supra note 1, at 490.




concerned either with an owner's property interest in an animal
or with controlling certain types of human behavoir thought to
be corrupting of men's morals, rather than with the actual well-
being of the animal.2
Consider as another example the wording of the stated pur-
pose of the Clean Air Act 22
to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so
as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive
capacity of its population
2 3
Or look to the congressional findings in the Endangered Species
Act, ' which are concerned with the "esthetic, ecological, educa-
tional, historical, recreational, and scientific value" of threatened
and endangered species to "the Nation and its people. 2 5 As
with the animal anticruelty statutes, a strong motivation behind
both these Acts, at least according to their statutory language,
appears to be to protect nature because of possible ill-effects or
benefits to man, not for nature's own sake.26
Some other environmental laws, however, may reflect a
hopeful mix of homocentric and nonhomocentric motivations.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),27 for example,
sets forth a Congressional declaration of national environmental
policy that speaks of "restoring and maintaining environmental
21. Dichter, supra note 4, at 149; Burr, supra note 4, at 207.
22. The Clean Air Act of 1955 was completely revised by the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. IV
1980). In this paper, references to the Clean Air Act mean the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977.
23. Clean Air Act § 101(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
24. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
25. Id. § 2(a)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3) (1976).
26. Despite the homocentric language, the Endangered Species Act, at least, has
been applied in dramatic nonhomocentric ways. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153 (1978).
It is ironic that statutes with homocentric language, such as the Endangered Species
Act, have sometimes been broadly construed by the courts, (see the discussion of the
Marine Mammal Protection Act, infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text), while other
statutes, such as the National Environmental Policy Act (infra notes 27-29 and accompa-
nying text) which was hoped to be a major breakthrough for environmental law, has been
narrowly construed by the courts. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Strycher's Bay Neighbor-
hood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).





quality to the overall welfare and development of man," but
then turns around and speaks of creating and maintaining "con-
ditions under which man and nature can exist in productive har-
mony."'2 8 Although the overall emphasis seems to be homocen-
tric, the beginnings of a non-homocentric appreciation of nature
can be seen. Commenting on this aspect of NEPA, Christopher
Stone has written that
Because the health and well-being of mankind depends upon the
health of the environment, these goals will often be so mutually
supportive that one can avoid deciding whether our rationale is to
advance "us" or a new "us" that includes the environment."
Another hopeful example of the move away from strict
homocentric motivations is the Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA).80 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in 1976
held that this Act is "to be administered for the benefit of the
protected species rather than for the benefit of commercial ex-
ploitation.""1 And a House committee report stated that the Act
takes "the interests of the animal as the prime consideration."'
The MMPA, so construed, seems to reflect an appreciation of
the intrinsic worth of porpoises, whales and the other marine
mammals that the Act was designed to protect, except that the
language of the Act itself reveals that it still is firmly rooted in
homocentric assumptions and values. One of the Congressional
findings set forth in the Act is that
marine mammals and marine mammal products either-
(A) move in interstate commerce, or
(B) affect the balance of marine ecosystems in a manner which is
important to other animals and animal products which move in
interstate commerce,
and that the protection and conservation of marine mammals is
therefore necessary to insure the continuing availability of those
28. Id. § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. 4331(a) (1976).
29. Stone, supra note 1, at 489. See supra note 26.
30. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981).
31. Committee for Humane Legislation v. Richardson, 540 F.2d 1141, 1148 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
32. H.R. REP. No. 92-707, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.




products which move in interstate commerce."3
Statutes such as MMPA and NEPA, like other environmen-
tal statutes, reflect strong homocentric concerns, but more im-
portantly, they also may reflect the beginnings of an awareness
that man is only part of a larger life and community that exists
on this planet. This awareness is partially a result of the growth
of the ecological sciences, which have begun to reveal how intri-
cately intertwined and interdependent all life is.s" As one ecolo-
gist has written:
A quality environment ... must involve more than simply
human interests. It must consider the living fabric of the entire
world, for it is becoming more and more apparent that what is
best for the world as a whole is ultimately best for its human
populations."'
It is here, where human interests and environmental well-being
intersect, that homocentric and nonhomocentric approaches and
attitudes can work together toward a common goal - as per-
haps they already do in statutes like NEPA and MMPA.
C. Criticisms and Suggested Alternatives
Even when the homocentric perspective acknowledges the
interdependency of the web of life, it is still tainted with a nar-
row-minded arrogance that distorts man's vision of the world. A
"pure" homocentric attitude towards nature that ignores the les-
sons of ecology is dangerous to humanity's and the planet's
physical well-being.36 But, an englightened homocentrism that
incorporates an awareness of man's dependency on the intrica-
cies of nature is still dangerous, but there the danger is to man's
mental and spiritual well-being.
33. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, § 2(5), 16 U.S.C. § 1361(5) (1976). The
findings go on to refer to marine mammals as "resources of great international signifi-
cance, esthetic and recreational as well as economic." Id. § 2(6), 16 U.S.C. § 1361(6)
(1976).
34. See Manaster, Law and the Dignity of Nature: Foundations of Environmental
Law, 26 Dx PAUL L. REv. 743, 745-46 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Manaster]; see gener-
ally SOUTHWICK, supra note 16.
35. SOUTHWICK, supra note 16, at xviii.
36. For an excellent overview of much of the destruction man has and is inflicting
on the environment and the possible resulting health dangers, see SOUTHWICK, supra




Lawrence Tribe, for example, has argued that the homocen-
tric perspective takes "the primal ethical impulse - the sense of
duty beyond self-" and flattens it into an "aspect of self-inter-
est."'3 7 In many people, Tribe argues, there is a deeply felt, but
often inchoate, sense of obligation to nature which has little to
do with perceived human priorities but which becomes distorted
and narrowed to fit into a human-wants view of life.3 8 Truly eth-
ical and altruistic attitudes towards nature are transformed into
mere computations of self-advantage."
Further, even if the homocentric perspective acknowledges
the need to protect nature, it does so out of no sense of obliga-
tion, with no respect for other life, and with no willingness to
move beyond the narrow boundaries of the human self. At its
best, it limits our ability to feel empathy for living beings who
are not like us; it reinforces the regrettable human tendency to
view other creatures as things devoid of inherent worth except
insofar as we can use them - or insofar as we are forced to re-
spect their integrity to protect our own well-being. Such
"thingification," in times past and with different objects, turned
nonwhite peoples into rightless things, even property, which
could be enslaved and oppressed.' 0 Such insensitivity to other
lives, at either the human or nonhuman level, surely undermines
our humanity and potential for true civilization.
As an alternative to the inadequacies of the homocentric
perspective, Christopher Stone, in his landmark article Should
Trees Have Standing? - Towards Legal Rights for Natural Ob-
jects,4 1 suggested that natural objects be allowed to have stand-
ing to sue for their own injuries and further be allowed an award
of some relief for those injuries. Specifically, he advocated a
scheme allowing human guardians or trustees to represent the
natural objects' interests in court, much as guardians represent
the interests of incompetents and infants who are incapable of
representing themselves. 3 This scheme would make natural ob-
jects holders of legal rights: they would "count jurally" and
37. Tribe I, supra note 1, at 1331-32.
38. Id. at 1329-32.
39. Id.
40. Stone, supra note 1, at 453-56.
41. Id.




would have a "legally recognized worth and dignity in [their]
own right, and not merely to serve as a means to benefit"
humans."'
Lawrence Tribe has also suggested that the perception that
" 'nature exists for itself" be given institutional expression,"'
and that a sense of obligation "to plant and animal life and to
objects of beauty" be developed. 45 He listed several concrete
possibilities. First, environmental impact statements could refer
explicitly to man's obligations to nature; second, new techniques
of policy analysis might be developed to account for such obliga-
tions; and finally, natural objects could be given rights as Stone
suggested."
Both Tribe and Stone recognized, however, that their sug-
gestions would sound odd to many people who are used to think-
ing in homocentric terms.47 Stone wrote that "[tihis is partly be-
cause until the rightless thing receives rights, we cannot see it as
anything but a thing for the use of 'us' - those who are holding
rights at the time.' 48 Compounding this shortsightedness is the
prevalent homocentric assumption, already described, that law
as a human creation is confined to ordering rights and duties
only within human society.49 This preconception makes it even
more difficult to justify or even imagine legal rights in nature.
Thus, before an extension of rights to nature can make
sense, the law's view of itself and its function in human society
has to be broadened; and a new perspective must be adopted
that will allow us not only to develop new legal forms, but also
to reevaluate the purposes that the law, society, and we as indi-
viduals should be serving. Does - or should - law aim only at
43. Id. at 458. Stone also suggested that private corporations might be required to
prepare internal reports concerning the adverse environmental effects of a corporation's
activity and to establish a Vice-President for Ecological Affairs. Id. at 484-85.
44. Tribe II, supra note 4, at 551-52.
45. Tribe I, supra note 1, at 1341.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1328-29, 1341; Stone, supra note 1, at 455.
48. Stone, supra note 1, at 455. In a footnote Stone continued,
[t]hus it was that the Founding Fathers could speak of the inalienable rights of all
men, and yet maintain a society that was, by modern standards, without the most
basic rights for Blacks, Indians, children and women. There was no hypocrisy;
emotionally, no one felt that these other things were men.
Id. at n.24.




satisfying our collective and transient wants and needs? Are our
aims as individuals and as a society merely to fulfill ourselves?
Or, at some point, do we have obligations that extend beyond
ourselves? And if so, on what are those obligations based, and
how should the law deal with them?
The remainder of this Comment will suggest possible an-
swers to these questions and will explore how the homocentric
perspective might be replaced by a perspective based on
Schweitzer's "Reverence for Life."50
III. The Perspective of Reverence
A. A Simple Model
The following simple, and rather limited, model is proposed
from which to start. This model is based on the premise that in
the world certain things have an inherent worth, in and of them-
selves, simply by the fact that they exist. Following from this
premise is the assertion that society, in the course of its develop-
ment, can come to recognize this inherent worth and value it,
regardless of considerations of utility. If society values suffi-
ciently the inherent worth of a thing, then it can bestow legal
rights upon the thing. These rights would be conferred in order
to protect the thing's inherent worth from abuse by human soci-
ety by creating duties which would require people to respect
that inherent worth.5 1 If these duties are violated, then specified
liabilities would be imposed."
50. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
51. "Rights" and "duties" are being used here in the Hohfeldian sense. "A duty...
is that which one ought or ought not to do. 'Duty' and 'right' are correlative terms. When
a right is invaded, a duty is violated." Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions
as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALz L.J. 16, 31-32 (1913) (quoting Lake Shore &
M.S.R. Co. v. Kurtz, 10 Ind. App. 60, -, 37 N.E. 303, 304 (1894).
52. To be fully understood, the rights just described must be distinguished from
rights that are designed to protect things that are valued for their usefulness, their bene-
fits to man, or their economic worth. These rights are not concerned with the inherent
qualities of a thing. Rather, they are concerned with fostering some utility or benefit to
human society. Generally, the thing that is valued for its usefulness does not receive the
right. Instead, the person to whom the thing is of use receives the right. The thing itself
is only a means to the right holder's end. Property rights are the prime example of this
type of right. Land is valued for the benefit it gives the one who uses it, and through that
person for the benefit it gives all of society; therefore, that person is given certain rights




One must distinguish at the outset the concept of inherent
worth, which is the premise of this model, from the concept of
natural rights, which envisions the existence of certain funda-
mental rights that are intrinsic to humans due to the operation
of some kind of natural law. According to theories of natural
rights, such rights are not created by man, and can invalidate
humanly created laws that conflict with them.5 3 Inherent worth,
by contrast, is an ineffable quality, not a right, which humans
can ignore or which they can come to value. If they value it,
then a sense of moral obligation can develop which in turn can
lead to the creation, by man, of rights and duties. The existence
of rights and duties are therefore dependent on man, even
though the inherent worth is not.54 As opposed to the natural
rights view, the legal validity of humanly created laws does not
hinge on their recognition of inherent worth.
This is not to say', however, that all binding obligations
upon man come only from the operation of law. Moral obliga-
tions arising from the existence of relationships between beings
that have inherent worth may in some circumstances arguably
be superior to conflicting legal obligations. This thought will not
be developed here; the point is simply to stress that the model
being presented should not be too quickly labelled as falling into
one of the traditional jurisprudential camps, be it natural law,
positivism, legal realism, or some other variation. The ultimate
lesson of the model, at least within the confines of this discus-
sion, is simply that if society fails to recognize and value the
inherent worth of a thing, then society will also probably fail to
mobilize its legal resources to protect that thing for the thing's
own sake."
Given this general framework of the model, there is no rea-
son why, at least theoretically, inherent worth need be recog-
53. See generally C. ANTIEAU, RIGHTS OF OUR FATHERS (1968); D. LLOYD, THE IDEA
OF LAW 70-95 (1964); R. TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES (1979).
54. This process of recognizing inherent worth and creating rights must also be dis-
tinguished from legal theories, such as that of Roscoe Pound, where various 'interests'
are recognized by society through the creation of legal rights. Inherent worth is neither a
synonym for a naturally exising right nor for an interest - human or otherwise - wait-
ing to be recognized. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of
what is meant by "inherent worth."




nized only in human beings as is presently the case. It also could
be recognized in other creatures or even in "nonliving entities
like canyons and cathedrals."' "5 Although one of the functions of
law is to structure human responsibilities and duties, those re-
sponsibilities and duties need not be limited to humanity, but
can include any part of existence for which humanity feels re-
spect or reverence - or for which it feels it ought to feel rever-
ence. Law can order human society not only for society's own
benefit, but also in the service of other obligations that tran-
scend our own wants and needs.
Simply, society can come to recognize and value the inher-
ent worth of an aspect of existence and can limit, for the sake of
the thing itself, society's own abusive and destructive tenden-
cies. Of course, once this has occurred, the thing no longer can
be treated as a thing; that is, it can no longer be an object of
pure use and manipulation, but becomes imbued with its own,
perhaps unknowable, meaning and purpose: it becomes its own
end, and not merely the means to some other's end. The black
man can no longer be property and enslaved; the woman be-
comes a full person in her own right; the child's existence is
respected as that of an adult;57 and perhaps the endangered spe-
cies' right to exist will also be recognized.
The homocentric perspective is not necessarily outside the
confines of this model. It can, and perhaps does, recognize the
existence of inherent worth, but when it does so, it limits it to
human beings." The central issue is, of course, whether such
recognition of inherent worth within human society should be
extended to things outside of human society.
In the light of the model set forth above, this issue can best
be approached by looking at three separate questions. First,
what is really meant by "inherent worth" and where does it
56. Tribe I, supra note 1, at 1345.
57. Stone, supra note 1, at 451, 453-56.
58. The homocentric perspective's approach to anything outside of human society
may be utilitarian, valuing nature for its use-value only, but its treatment of fellow
humans may admit to a greater degree of altruism. Much of modern American constitu-
tional law's concern with "fundamental rights" and the innate dignity of the human per-
son arguably revolves around a recognition of a human being's inherent worth. At least





come from? Second, whatever it may be, why recognize it and
value it in nature? And third, if we do admit the possibility of
valuing the inherent worth of nature, what does this mean for
the law? Each of these three questions will be addressed in turn.
B. Inherent Worth
First, it is necessary to look more closely at what is meant
by "inherent worth." Basically, to say that something has inher-
ent worth is to say that it has a significance which is intrinsic to
it and which is not dependent on anything or anyone else. It is
also another way of saying that the thing has a sanctity or sa-
credness immanent within its very essence.
Several religious and scientific explanations for the source
of this inherent worth can be given. For instance, from a Judeo-
Christian perspective, it might be argued that a Divine Being
imbues life with a sanctity it otherwise would not have. St. Fran-
cis of Assisi, who overflowed with love for all life, perhaps best
reflected this understanding in his life and thought. He saw "all
things animate and inanimate, [as] designed for the glorification
of their transcendent Creator"' 9 and "tried to depose man from
his monarchy over creation and set up a democracy of all God's
creatures."60 A variation of this viewpoint might replace the
transcendent God of St. Francis of Assisi with a pantheistic
spirit or life force immanent in all of existence. Or from a scien-
tific viewpoint, inherent worth might be seen as arising from the
unique function each part of life performs in the intricate ecol-
ogy of nature."
Each of these explanations, although praiseworthy in many
respects, is not completely satisfactory for the purposes of the
model being developed here, for each conceives of inherent
worth as being dependent on a reality or essence which either
transcends a thing's existence or can be separated, at least intel-
lectually, from it. To this extent, the source of sacredness is
placed outside the thing itself. The result is that, as Thomas'
Merton wrote, "[elverything always points to something else
59. White, supra note 1, at 1207.
60. Id. at 1206.
61. See Tribe I, supra note 1, at 1337; LEOPOLD, supra note 1, at 230-236; ASHay,




* . . Nothing is allowed just to be and to mean itself: everything
has to mysteriously signify something else." 2
The concept of inherent worth being developed here, in con-
trast, is actually closer to the Buddhist concept of "suchness,"
which has been described as being a concept that "indicates the
world just as it is, unscreened and undivided by the symbols and
definitions of thought."63 According to this view, the sanctity of
existence arises from the flux of life as it is, in itself, indepen-
dent of human conceptions that try to limit and define it.
Thus, sanctity does not necessarily arise because the wild-
flower glorifies the transcedent God, or because the forest vi-
brates with a universal and immanent life force, or because a
species is tied into a greater ecology. Rather, it arises - under
this model at least - from the simple fact that all these things
actually exist and are as they are. Nothing else need be pointed
to; and all that is required of man is an awareness of "[t]he in-
describable wonder of being . . . [that] is seen to spread until it
envelops an object as common and natural as the tree in your
backyard."""
The underlying assumption beneath this entire discussion is
that there is an ineffability to existence which imbues life with
an innate meaning or sanctity which is independent of human
understanding and thought. Scientific or religious thought may
help us appreciate its wonder, but the innate sanctity or worth
itself cannot be actually described by such thoughts: it is a mys-
tery that can be respected, but never penetrated or subjugated
by man.
It is here, in this assumption that life is "unfathomably
mysterious," that the perspective based on the ethic of "Rever-
ence for Life" finds it roots." Schweitzer asks simply, "[w]ho
among us knows what significance any other kind of life has in
itself, and as a part of the universe? ' 66 According to this per-
62. T. MERTON, ZEN AND THE BIRDS OF APPETITE 50 (1968).
63. A. WATTS, THE WAY OF ZEN 67 (1957).
64. H. SMrrH, THE RELIGIONS OF MAN 150 (Perennial Library ed. 1965). The quota-
tion in the text is taken from Smith's discussion of Zen Buddhism.
65. SCHWEITZER, supra note 8, at 158. Schweitzer also writes that true ethics arise
from the recognition that "life as such is the mysterious value with which [ethics has] to
deal." Id. at 232.




spective, the true purpose of human life is to reach beyond our
self-preoccupations and begin to appreciate the wonder of an-
other's existence - be it human or nonhuman. 7
C. Valuing Nature for its Own Sake
The next question to be addressed is why we should recog-
nize and value the inherent worth of nature? One response is to
argue that considerations of human advantage may force us to
do so. As man poisons and upsets the delicate web of life, he
creates greater and greater dangers to his own physical well-be-
ing, as well as that of the planet.68 These growing dangers can be
averted, the argument goes, only if profound social changes take
place, and such changes mandate "a serious reconsideration of
our consciousness towards the environment. '" By coming to
value nature for its own sake, our perception of our place in the
universe changes and we supposedly gain the flexibility and will-
ingness necessary to make the sacrifices needed to avert ecologi-
cal disaster.0
At a more fundmental level, however, it must be realized
how homocentric the question "why recognize and value nature's
inherent worth?" is. In essence, it is asking, "what's in it for us
humans?" If the only purpose and reason for man's life is to
maximize human wants, pleasures, and needs, then ultimately
there can be no justification for valuing the inherent worth of
the life of nature. From such a perspective, nature can only be
valued for its usefulness and value to man.
A true justification for valuing nature's inherent worth is
therefore possible only if homocentric biases are renounced and
a new understanding of the purpose of man's life is adopted.
Christopher Stone has written that
we have to give up some psychic investment in our sense of sepa-
rateness and specialness in the universe. And this, in turn, is hard
67. Id. at 231. Schweitzer writes that "[als a being in an active relation to the world
(man] comes into a spiritual relation with it by not living for himself alone, but feeling
himself one with all life that comes within his reach." Id.
68. SOUTHWICK, supra note 16, at 12-68; Manaster, supra note 33, at 746; Stone,
supra note 1, at 492.
69. Stone, supra note 1, at 493. But see gnerally Ashby, supra note 1.





giving indeed. .. Yet, in doing so, we - as persons - gradually
free ourselves of needs for supportive illusions."
In recognizing the inherent worth of something other than our-
selves, we also recognize our own limits, that we are not the
source and measure of all meaning in the universe. Our parochi-
alism is diminished; our appreciation of our interdependence
with all of life, human and non-human, is increased; and the
self-preoccupied arrogance of the homocentric perspective is
undermined.
It is interesting to note that some scientists have begun to
move toward an appreciation of these points. Eric Ashby, for in-
stance, has pointed out that modern day scientists have become
the "most effective defenders of nature," due in part because
they have developed an I-Thou, as opposed to an I-It, relation-
ship with nature."' Ashby writes that this attitude has arisen
because,
[s]cientists have become more and more impressed - awed is
perhaps a better word - by the interdependence of things in na-
ture. Animals, green plants, insects, bacteria are partners with
man in the same ecosystems. No one can predict the full conse-
quences of tinkering with any part of an ecosystem. Even the
non-living environment has properties without which life as we
know it would be inconceivable. The idea of man as lord of nature
is, in the minds of scientists, replaced by the idea of man in sym-
biosis with nature.73
Although such considerations may not lead to a description of
what inherent worth is, they can lead to an appreciation of and a
sensitivity to its value. For Ashby and other scientists these con-
siderations constitute the beginnings of an environmental ethic
whose "premise is that respect for nature is more moral than
lack of respect for nature. 7 4 This ethic justifies preserving an
endangered species, a landscape, or a valley filled with wildlife
because such things are "unique," "irreplaceable," and "part of
the fabric of nature, just as Chartres and [a] painting by Consta-
71. Stone, supra note 1, at 496.
72. AsHBY, supra note 1, at 82.
73. Id. at 82-83.




ble are part of the fabric of civilization. ' 75
D. The Legal Implications
The final question to be addressed is what does all of this
mean for the life of the law? First and foremost, by replacing
homocentric aspirations and values with ones derived from a
perspective of reverence, it becomes reasonable for the law to
recognize the existence of human obligations to the nonhuman
world and to enforce those obligations through the creation of
legal rights and duties. Even if we as individuals can not yet feel
reverence for that which is of no "use" to us, we can give legal
expression to the conviction that we should feel such reverence.
At the very least, and as a first step, we can admit our tendency
to thoughtlessly destroy, waste, and abuse nature for our own
purposes, and use the coercive force of law to limit our "'enthu-
siasms of exploitation.' ,,76
Further, the incorporation into legal decision making of the
ideals of reverence for life, along with related concrete proposals,
such as giving rights to wildlife and natural objects, could affect
a subtle change in the entire legal endeavor. Consider, for exam-
ple, the following reasoning:
[T]he vocabulary and expressions that are available to us influ-
ence and even steer our thought. Consider the effect that was had
by introducing into the law terms like "motive," "intent," and
"due process." These terms work a subtle shift into the rhetoric
of explanation available to judges; with them, new ways of think-
ing and new insights come to be explored and developed. In such
fashion, judges who could unabashedly refer to the "legal rights of
the environment" would be encouraged to develop a viable body
of law - in part simply through the availability and force of the
expression. Besides, such a manner of speaking by courts would
contribute to popular notions, and a society that spoke of the "le-
gal rights of the environment" would be inclined to legislate more
environment-protection rules by formal enactment.7"
Possibly, if the rhetoric of reverence gained a degree of respecta-
75. Id. at 85.
76. H. BROOKS, ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING 120, quoted in ASHBY, supra note
1, at 85.




bility it could also enrich other fields of law besides that of envi-
ronmental law. The effect in areas such as human rights law,
poverty law, or even international law is impossible to predict,
for as our values and assumptions about the legitimate function
and scope of the law shift, so will our legal expressions and
institutions.
On a more immediate level, the thought of giving rights to
the environment might still be disturbing to lawyers and jurists
unable to free themselves completely from their lifelong
homocentric conditioning. They might ask, with concern, "How
fundamental will nature's rights be?" and "Will human interests
and rights be sacrificed to those of nature?"
Recognizing rights in nature does not mean that nature will
receive the same rights and treatment as people. Christopher
Stone writes that,
to say that the environment should have rights is not to say that
it should have every right we can imagine, or even the same body
of rights as human beings have. Nor is it to say that everything in
the environment should have the same rights as every other thing
in the environment.76
Just as there is a variety of rights for people which sometimes
come into conflict, so will there be a variety of environmental
rights," each carrying a different weight and effect. They too
will sometimes come into conflict with each other and with other
classes of rights. The courts will then be left to their traditional
task of balancing the conflicting rights and interests according to
the degree with which society has decided to value each. At
times, human interests will be sacrificed for the benefit of na-
ture's well-being, and at times they will not. It will depend on
the facts of each case.
Also, admitting that nature can be valued for its own sake
78. Id. at 457-58.
79. One commentator, for instance, in writing about animal rights has pointed out
that
[t]he difference between humans and animals would obviously give rise to differ-
ent treatment and different rights, just as the differences between children and
adults may give rise to different kinds of rights. Thus, it could be ridiculous to
give infants the right to vote or dogs the right to free speech, since these rights
would be meaningless in terms of capacity to utilize the rights.




does not mean that all of nature is suddenly sanctified and fro-
zen as is, or that all else must be sacrificed to preserve that sanc-
tity.8o The inherent worth or sacredness of a life may in some
sense be "absolute," but society's recognition of it varies de-
pending on society's moral, ethical, and legal development. 1
Similarly, just as human rights to life and liberty can be
overridden by our criminal justice system, hopefully only after
due process of law has been served, so too might nature's rights
be overriden - but hopefully only after their importance has
been carefully considered and appreciated. As Schweitzer
recognized,
man comes again and again into the position of being able to pre-
serve his own life and life generally only at the cost of other life.
If he has been touched by the ethic of Reverance for Life, he in-
jures and destroys life only under a necessity which he cannot
avoid, and never from thoughtlessness. So far as he is a free man
he uses every opportunity of tasting the blessedness of being able
to assist life and avert from it suffering and destruction.s
But, if it does become necessary to destroy life, then in the legal
arena careful consideration of the problem should include the
recognition that human society bears "the responsibility for the
life which is sacrificed. 8 3
One way of insuring this recognition is by imbuing natural
objects and wildlife with procedural rights to sue on their own
behalf as well as by creating substantive rights through legisla-
tion. And one way of making sense of such an extension of
80. Tribe feared that "[tireating the existing order as sacred ... might well relegate
to permanent subjugation and deprivation those many who are not now among the privi-
leged, freezing the social evolution of humanity into its contemporary mold." Tribe I,
supra note 1, at 1337-38. The framework being set forth here will, it is hoped, avoid this
problem, since it does not sanction idolizing humanity's present or future appreciation of
the sacredness of the world, but admits to an evolving and changing recognition of the
sacredness of both the human and nonhuman aspects of existence.
81. For instance, society may come to value the inherent worth of an entire species,
especially if it is endangered, and recognize its right to exist to be more fundamental
than the right to life of a single tree who may have only limited individual rights.
In a similiar vein, Stone has suggested that a list of "preferred objects" in the envi-
ronment be compiled that would be analagous to a list of "preferred rights" in humans.
Both would invoke a courts highest scrutiny when violated. Stone, supra note 1, at 486.
82. SCHWEITzeR, supra note 8, at 234.




rights, as we have seen, is by replacing our homocentric biases
and assumptions with a view of the world that recognizes and
values the inherent worth of all life simply out of a sense of
reverence.
IV. Conclusion
This Comment has attempted to sketch the outline of a le-
gal framework that can justify an extension of rights to nature.
This framework requires from us a degree of altruism and a
commitment to the inherent worth of things beyond ourselves.
Such a commitment, it has been argued, can make sense to us
only if we broaden our perspective from that of a creature pre-
occupied with its own needs and desires to one that is able to
recognize responsibilities to the large community of life. By ex-
tending legal rights to the environment, we can give institutional
expression to this expanded sense of responsibility. But, ex-
tending rights to the environment does not mean that human
interests will be automatically subjugated to those of nature, al-
though it may change "the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror
of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it.''84
Such a change can be humbling. It forces us to re-evaluate our
place in the universe and the meaning and purpose of our lives.
But by doing so, the door is opened to developing a more civi-
lized and gentler relationship, founded in law, with the rest of
nature.
Steven Chananie
84. LEOPOLD, supra note 1, at 219-20.
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